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Abstract 
 
We examine whether the reiteration of past credit ratings (i.e., credit rating affirmation) provides 
value-relevant information to equity analysts and stock investors. While a large body of accounting 
and finance research provides evidence on the informational role of credit rating downgrades and 
upgrades, the informational effects of credit rating affirmations remain unexplored, despite the fact 
that the frequency of issuing rating affirmations is 1.6 times greater than that of issuing both rating 
downgrades and upgrades. Using a sample of US corporate credit rating reports that reiterate the 
previous credit ratings over the period of April 1995-June 2018, we find that equity analysts’ earn-
ings forecast dispersion and stock return volatility—proxies for information uncertainty—decrease 
within a 30-day window following the credit rating affirmation announcements. The reduction in 
information uncertainty after rating affirmation is mainly driven by firms with non-investment 
grade bonds, whereas such reduction is not statistically significant for firms with investment grade 
bonds. We next find that the stock market reaction to affirmations is significantly positive on av-
erage and the positive reaction is most pronounced for firms with non-investment grade bonds. 
Taken together, our findings suggest that credit rating affirmations reduce information uncertainty 
and stock market investors find it useful for their investment decisions, particularly for firms with 
non-investment grade bonds. This study enhances our understanding of the non-trivial informa-
tional value of the credit rating affirmations for equity market participants.
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Information Content of Credit Rating Affirmations 
1. Introduction 
While a large body of accounting and finance research provides evidence on the infor-
mation content of credit rating changes (upgrades or downgrades), there is no research on the in-
formation content of credit rating affirmations (i.e., reiteration of past credit ratings). Since credit 
rating affirmations indicate that the credit rating on a firm’s ability to pay back debt and interest 
remains the same as before, prior studies might have assumed that reiterations of prior credit rat-
ings do not convey meaningful information content to capital market participants including equity 
analysts and stock investors. However, it is intriguing to observe that credit rating agencies issue 
a greater number of rating affirmations (about 62% of all credit rating announcements) than those 
of upgrades and downgrades, combined together. Out of the 67,555 credit rating announcements 
during our sample period of April 1995-June 2018, there are 41,758 rating affirmations, which are 
far greater than 25,797 credit rating changes combined (16,515 downgrades and 9,282 upgrades). 
A natural question is why the academics ignore such large number of rating affirmations. Does 
researchers assume that these affirmation announcements are trivial or non-informative events? 
We attempt to fill this gap between academic research and practices by credit rating agencies by 
examining whether equity analysts and stock investors find credit rating affirmations useful for 
their decisions.  
Whether credit rating downgrades and upgrades are informative to equity investors has 
long been examined by both accounting and finance researchers. On the one hand, research finds 
that credit rating agencies have considerable privileged access to management and claim to receive 
private information including the issuer’s acquisition, expansion, new product, and debt issuance 
plans (Goh and Ederington, 1993), and credit rating announcements play a significant role in stock 
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and bond valuations (Goh and Ederington, 1999), thus suggesting that credit ratings provide value-
relevant information to capital market participants. On the other hand, some other research (e.g., 
Altman and Rijken, 2004; Baker and Mansi, 2002) provides evidence that credit ratings are un-
timely because credit rating agencies consider the stability and soundness of credit ratings to be 
most important, implying that credit ratings are lack of relevant forward-looking information con-
tent. Prior studies (e.g., Ederington and Goh, 1998; Holthausen and Leftwich, 1986; Jorion et al., 
2005) test these two arguments based on credit rating downgrades and upgrades and find that stock 
market investors negatively (positively) react to downgrades (upgrades) while the magnitude of 
reaction is greater for downgrades than for upgrades. Taken together, the weight of evidence sug-
gests that credit rating downgrades and upgrades are informative to investors.  
However, to the best of our knowledge, there is no study on the nature of credit rating 
affirmations in terms of information content. Apart from being the first study on credit rating af-
firmation, understanding the effects of rating affirmation is consequential as the frequency of is-
suing rating affirmations is much higher than that of issuing both downgrades and upgrades.  
In this study, we attempt to fill this void by investigating the informational effects of credit 
rating affirmations on equity market participants. We use change in equity analysts’ earnings fore-
cast dispersion and change in stock return volatility before and after affirmation announcements 
as proxies for change in information uncertainty, which is widely used in the literature (e.g., Di-
ether et al., 2002; Zhang, 2006a; Zhang, 2006b; Moeller et al., 2007; Barron et al. 2009; Rees and 
Thomas 2010; and Sheng and Thevenot 2012). In line with prior literature, we require forecasts 
made within 90 days before the affirmation announcement and revised within 30 days after the 
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rating announcement.1 As an alternative measure of information uncertainty, we use stock return 
volatility. Similar to the construction of earnings forecast dispersion, we measure a change in stock 
return volatility as the change in standard deviation of daily stock returns for 30 days prior to 
affirmation announcements and that for 30 days after affirmation announcements.2 Using a sample 
of credit rating affirmations during April 1995-June 2018 from the Mergent Fixed Investment Se-
curities Database (FISD), we find evidence that on average, both earnings forecast dispersion and 
stock return volatility are significantly reduced after affirmation announcements.  
We next test whether the reduction in analysts’ earnings forecast dispersion and stock re-
turn volatility after affirmation announcements is more pronounced as affirmed prior credit ratings 
are worse. We predict that the impact of affirmation announcements on the reduction in analysts’ 
earnings forecast dispersion and return volatility will be greater for firms with non-investment 
grade bonds than for those with investment grade bonds, which presumably have less information 
uncertainty compared to non-investment grade bonds. We find that, compared to firms with the 
most favorable credit ratings (i.e., AAA and AA), firms with non-investment grades experience a 
greater reduction in both earnings forecast dispersion and stock return volatility after the credit 
rating affirmation announcements. This difference is also economically significant in that the mag-
nitude of the reduction in earnings forecast dispersion and stock return volatility for firms with 
non-investment grades is 12.1 and 10.9 times larger than the magnitude of the reduction in both 
measures for firms with AAA and AA credit ratings, respectively.  
                                                 
1 We use 90-day window prior to affirmations to increase our sample size, but our results are qualitatively similar 
when we use forecasts issued within 30-day window prior to credit rating affirmations instead of 90-day window. To 
obtain a better measure of dispersion, we require at least four observations to estimate the standard deviation. 
2 The results are similar when we use different 90 days window for measuring stock return volatility before and after 
affirmation announcement. One advantage of using stock return volatility is to overcome small sample size problem 
with earnings forecast dispersion. 
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We also examine the stock market reaction to rating affirmations using the 3-day cumula-
tive abnormal returns around affirmation announcements. If rating affirmations do not provide any 
incremental information, we expect that stock investors do not react to affirmation announcements. 
In contrast, if rating affirmations are informative, stock investors would react to affirmation an-
nouncements. We find that on average, the stock market reaction to affirmations is significantly 
positive, suggesting that investors view rating affirmations favorably. Motivated by prior research 
(e.g., Jorion and Zhang 2007), we further examine whether stock investors’ reactions to affirma-
tion announcements are different, depending on prior credit ratings. Consistent with our main find-
ings that the reduction in information uncertainty is most pronounced for firms with non-invest-
ment grade bonds, we find that the stock market reaction is significantly positive only for firms 
with non-investment grade credit ratings, whereas stock market reaction to other firms with in-
vestment grade ratings is not statistically significant. The difference in the stock market reaction 
to affirmations between the most favorable credit ratings and non-investment credit ratings is on 
average 0.64% for the three days around affirmation announcement, which appears to be econom-
ically significant.  
Finally, in order to understand the sources of positive stock market reaction to credit rating 
affirmation announcements, we examine how affirmations affect earnings forecast revisions. 
Standard dividend discount model predicts that positive stock market reactions to an economic 
event would be due to an increase in future cash flows (i.e., the numerator effect of standard divi-
dend discount model) and/or a decrease in discount rate (i.e., the denominator effect of standard 
dividend discount model). If positive stock market reaction to affirmation announcements is due 
to earnings forecast revisions, we expect positive earnings forecast revisions to affirmation an-
nouncements. However, we find that on average, rating affirmations are associated with negative 
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earnings forecast revisions,3 suggesting that positive stock market reactions to rating affirmation 
announcements is more likely due to the reduction in information uncertainty (i.e., the denominator 
effect) and less likely due to positive earnings forecast revisions (i.e., the numerator effect).  
We perform several robustness checks. First, we directly examine how the change in earn-
ings forecast dispersion is associated with stock market reactions to rating affirmations in order to 
understand whether our findings on the positive stock market reactions to affirmation announce-
ments is due to the reduction in information uncertainty. We find that stock market reaction to 
affirmations is significantly positively associated with earnings forecast revision and negatively 
related to change in earnings forecast dispersion as well as change in return volatility. This sug-
gests that our results are driven by affirmations reducing information uncertainty of firms’ future 
payoff, particularly with regard to discount rate news.  
Second, in all analyses, we exclude affirmation announcements made during management 
earnings forecast and earnings announcement periods since such events can also affect firms’ in-
formation environment including information uncertainty. Thus, our results are less likely due to 
concurrent management earnings forecast or earning announcement events around rating affirma-
tion announcements.  
Third, to rule out the possibility that our results are driven by rating watches or outlooks, 
we also perform our analysis with excluding affirmations with credit watches. We find that our 
results are robust to excluding such observations.  
                                                 
3 One plausible explanation for this result is that rating affirmations contribute to correcting equity analysts’ opti-
mism in their earnings forecasts. 
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Fourth, we also use the absolute value of CAR(-1,1) as an alternative dependent variable to 
measure the extent of information content (e.g., Cready and Hurtt 2002) and find that the coeffi-
cient on DMM4 is significantly positive, suggesting that the information content of affirmations is 
greater for the worst credit ratings compared to the most favorable credit ratings. In summary, the 
additional results corroborate our main findings that credit rating affirmations, particularly for 
firms with non-investment grade bonds, are useful for equity analysts and stock market investors, 
because rating affirmations reduce such firms’ information uncertainty. 
We contribute to the prior literature on information content of credit ratings, including 
Ederington and Goh (1998), Holthausen and Leftwich (1986) and Jorion et al. (2005) in two ways. 
First, we shed lights on the previously unexplored area in credit rating literature (i.e., credit rating 
affirmations). That is, the extant research has not provided any evidence on whether and how the 
announcements of credit rating affirmations affect information uncertainty about firms’ future pay-
offs, for equity analysts and stock investors. Our paper attempts to fill this void and provides novel 
evidence on the information role of credit rating affirmations. Second, we contribute to the litera-
ture on the value of confirming prior information, for example, Clement et al. (2003) who examine 
the reiteration of management guidance. By using a sample of rating affirmations which prior 
studies generally ignore with implicit assumption that affirmations do not contain any information 
content, we show that the reiteration of prior credit ratings is significantly associated with positive 
stock market reaction which is due to the reduction in information uncertainty and that those asso-
ciations are significantly influenced by prior credit ratings. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we discuss relevant credit 
rating research and develop our hypotheses. Section 3 describes the data and the construction of 
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the main variables. Section 4 presents the research design, the descriptive statistics, and the main 
empirical results, and Section 5 shows several robustness checks. Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. Literature Review and Hypothesis Development 
Credit rating change announcements 
Rating agencies claim to receive inside information, such as minutes of board meetings, 
profit breakdowns by product, and new product plans, unavailable to other market participants 
(Ederington and Yawitz, 1987). To test this claim, prior research investigates informational effects 
of credit (or bond) rating downgrades and upgrades (e.g., Holthausen and Leftwich 1986; Jorion 
et al., 2005). For example, using a sample of 637 credit rating changes by Moody's and S&P, 
Holthausen and Leftwich (1986) find that rating downgrades are associated with negative abnor-
mal stock returns around the two-day window beginning the day of the press release by the rating 
agencies. Hand et al. (1992) examine whether bond prices react to credit rating downgrades and 
upgrades. They show that average (median) excess bond return is -1.27% (-0.45%) to credit rating 
downgrades from Moody’s and S&P and bonds with non-investment grades react more negatively 
to rating downgrades compared to investment grade bonds. The mean and median excess bond 
returns are about 0.35% to credit rating upgrades from Moody’s and S&P.  Recently, Jung et al. 
(2016) examine how equity analysts react to credit rating downgrades and upgrades and show that 
equity analysts tend to revise their earnings forecasts downward (upward) after credit rating down-
grades (upgrades). 
Jorion et al. (2005) investigate the informational effects of Regulation FD (Reg FD) on 
credit rating changes. Reg FD prohibited selective disclosure to a few privileged parties including 
equity analysts. However, Reg FD excludes credit rating agencies from its scope, thus, after Reg 
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FD was put in place, credit analysts have relative information advantage over other parties such as 
equity analysts since credit analysts have access to private information such as board of directors’ 
meeting minutes, or corporate strategy plan. Given the informational advantage of credit analysts, 
the rating changes can be more informative in the post Reg FD period. Consistent with this chain 
of reasoning, Jorion et al. (2005) find the increased information content of credit rating changes in 
the post Reg FD period.  
The effect of affirmation announcements on information uncertainty 
While prior research mostly focuses on the information content of credit rating changes, 
our knowledge is limited as to whether credit rating affirmation reports have information that is 
useful to equity market investors. According to Moody’s,4 an ‘Affirmation’ is defined as a public 
statement that the current credit rating assigned to an issuer or debt obligation, which is not cur-
rently under review, continues to be appropriately positioned. An ‘Affirmation’ is generally issued 
to communicate raters’ opinion that a publicly visible credit development does not have a direct 
impact on an outstanding rating. Thus, affirmations are designed to confirm prior ratings, suggest-
ing that affirmations are not supposed to change capital markets’ expectation about future cash 
flows. However, although credit rating affirmations may not change the expectation about future 
cash flows, they can be informative to investors if they can reduce the information uncertainty in 
bond ratings.5 Thus, if credit rating affirmations reduce information uncertainty which equity mar-
ket participants face with respect to issuers’ creditworthiness, stock investors will perceive credit 
rating affirmations favorably. In this case, we expect stock market reaction to affirmation an-
nouncements to be significantly positive. In contrast, if affirmation announcements do not affect 
                                                 
4 https://www.moodys.com/researchdocumentcontentpage.aspx?docid=PBC_79004 
5  Most of affirmation reports by Fitch are issued as part of its routine review. Our results are robust to the exclusion 
of Fitch credit rating affirmations. 
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information uncertainty and thus, are not informative, there will be no stock market reaction to 
affirmation announcements. This leads to our first set of hypotheses, stated in alternative form: 
H1a: Credit rating affirmations reduce information uncertainty of equity market participants. 
H1b: Credit rating affirmations lead to positive stock market reaction. 
 
The effect of affirmation announcements on information uncertainty for non-investment grade 
Next, we examine when rating affirmations reduce information uncertainty to a larger ex-
tent. We are particularly interested in the effect of prior credit ratings to affirmation announce-
ments since affirmations basically reiterate prior credit ratings. We hypothesize that the effect of 
affirmations on a change in information uncertainty should be distinct between low-rated and high-
rated firms due to the following reason. Jorion and Zhang (2007) find that informational effects of 
credit rating change announcements are greater for low-rated firms relative to high-rated firms. 
They find that after controlling for credit rating changes, the magnitude of stock market reaction 
to downgrades and upgrades is stronger as prior credit ratings are worse, suggesting that prior 
credit rating is a significant factor in determining the informativeness of credit rating changes. 
While they don’t directly examine the relation between the level of prior credit ratings and change 
in information uncertainty after credit rating change announcement, a plausible explanation for 
their results would be that information uncertainty prior to bond rating changes is reduced to a 
larger extent when prior credit ratings are worse. Our research setting allows us to directly address 
the validity of this explanation since our analysis is solely based on affirmation sample, which by 
nature controls for the magnitude of credit rating changes. In addition, Cheng and Subramanyam 
(2008) document that analyst coverage is higher for firms with more favorable credit ratings. Fol-
lowing Cheng and Subramanyam (2008), we presume that equity analysts are less likely to follow 
firms with worse credit ratings and therefore predict that the role of rating affirmations in terms of 
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the reduction in information uncertainty is greater for low-rated firms. Again, if rating affirmations 
reduce information uncertainty for worse credit ratings to a larger extent than for more favorable 
credit ratings, we expect stock market reaction to affirmation announcements to be more positive 
for worse credit ratings. This leads to our second set of hypothesis, stated in alternative form: 
H2a: Credit rating affirmations reduce information uncertainty to a larger extent for firms 
with worse credit ratings. 
H2b: The positive stock market reaction to credit rating affirmations is stronger for firms 
with worse credit ratings. 
 
3. Sample Selection and Variable Definitions 
3.1. Sample selection 
We obtain bond rating announcements from the Mergent Fixed Investment Securities Da-
tabase (FISD). The database contains detailed information on bond ratings from S&P, Moody's, 
Fitch, and Duff & Phelps.6 Our initial sample consists of all bond rating announcements from April 
1995 — when Mergent FISD started covering corporate bonds—to June 2018, the latest available 
date of the database. 
Table 1 provides the sample selection details. Following prior studies (e.g., Jorion et al., 
2005; Jung et al., 2016), we exclude the following bonds from our sample: (i) Yankee bonds, (ii) 
bonds which are denominated in a foreign currency, (iii) bonds issued through private placement, 
(iv) bonds which can be converted to common stock, and (v) subsidiary and subordinated bonds. 
We keep the observations with the largest offering amount, if multiple rating announcements are 
made on the same day. After these screenings and excluding rating upgrades and downgrades, we 
obtain 41,758 affirmation observations. Next, we merge our sample with the Compustat, CRSP, 
                                                 
6 Fitch acquired Duff & Phelps Credit Rating Co. on March 8, 2000 and thus, the FISD eliminated the use of Duff & 
Phelps name in credit rating. 
11 
 
and I/B/E/S databases to get financial information, stock price data, and analysts’ earnings forecast 
data, respectively. These data restrictions significantly reduce our sample to 9,429 observations. 
We then exclude observations that do not have available data for control variables, observations 
whose affirmation announcement dates are identical to earnings announcements and/or manage-
ment earnings forecasts, and observations whose stock price is smaller than $1. This set of sample 
selection criteria results in 8,443 firm-year observations. Finally, when we test using a change in 
analyst earnings forecast dispersion which requires at least four earnings forecasts issued within 
90 days before and 30 days after a rating affirmation, the sample size is further reduced to 3,404 
firm-year observations. 
3.2. Variable definitions 
To measure change in information uncertainty around credit rating affirmations, we use 
both change in equity analysts’ forecast dispersion and change in stock return volatility. In the 
prior literature, analyst forecast dispersion and stock return volatility are widely used to measure 
the uncertainty about future earnings or the degree of consensus among equity analysts, and the 
degree of consensus among equity market investors (e.g., Barron et al., 2009; Rees and Thomas, 
2010; Zhang, 2006a). We measure the change in financial analysts’ earnings forecast dispersion 
(Chg_Dispersion) as the change in standard deviation of analysts’ individual forecasts of year t+1 
earnings before and after the credit rating affirmations scaled by the stock price. In calculating 
earnings forecast dispersion, we use forecasts issued within 90-day window prior to credit rating 
affirmation announcements and within 30-day window following the rating affirmations and meas-
ure change in earnings forecast dispersion before and after affirmations, respectively (Bozanic and 
Thevenot 2015; Rees and Thomas 2010). If a single analyst provides multiple forecasts in pre-
(post-) affirmation window, we use only the last (first) available forecast. Similarly, we measure 
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change in stock return volatility (Chg_RetVol) as change in standard deviation of daily stock re-
turns over 30 days before and after the rating affirmations. 
We use the following indicator variables for prior credit ratings to take into account poten-
tial non-linear relations between credit ratings and variables of our interest: DMM1 through DMM4. 
Our classification is also similar to the classification scheme in prior research (e.g., Jorion et al., 
2005). DMM1 is an indicator variable that equals one if credit ratings are AAA and AA from S&P, 
Aaa and Aa from Moody’s, AAA and AA from Fitch or Duff and Phelps, and 0 otherwise. DMM2 
is an indicator variable that equals one if a credit rating is A from S&P, Moody’s, Fitch or Duff 
and Phelps, and 0 otherwise. DMM3 is an indicator variable that equals one if a credit rating is 
BBB from S&P, Baa from Moody’s, BBB from Fitch or Duff and Phelps, and 0 otherwise. DMM4 
equals 1 if a credit rating is below BBB from S&P, below Baa from Moody’s, below BBB from 
Fitch or Duff and Phelps, and 0 otherwise. We are particularly interested in DMM4 since it indi-
cates non-investment grades. Appendix I shows how we classify the credit ratings across different 
rating agencies.  
 
4. Results 
4.1. Descriptive statistics 
Panel A of Table 2 provides descriptive statistics for variables of our interest. The average 
CAR (-1,1), stock market reaction around affirmation announcements is 0.12%, suggesting that the 
stock market reaction to affirmations is on average positive, but economically trivial. The average 
change in analyst forecast dispersion after rating affirmation is -0.0005, while the median is -
0.0002. The mean and median changes in stock return volatility are -0.0006 and -0.0004, respec-
tively. These results suggest that credit rating affirmations reduce both analyst forecast dispersion 
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and stock return volatility which are our proxies for information uncertainty. About 7.07% of credit 
rating affirmations belong to the most favorable prior credit rating group - DMM1 (i.e., AAA and 
AA or Aaa and Aa), while 33.38% of affirmations belong to DMM2 (i.e., A). The next group, 
DMM3 (BBB or Baa) consists of 41.21% of affirmations and 18.35% of affirmations are the worst 
prior credit rating group - DMM4 (i.e., non-investment grades). The average value of MTB in our 
sample is 2.71, indicating that on average, the market value of equity for our sample firms is about 
2.71 times of book value of equity. The average leverage is 0.31, indicating that about one third of 
total assets consists of debt in our sample. The sample firms are covered by a large number of 
analysts, with either average or median firm covered by 22 equity analysts (ANA_COV). The mean 
and median distance in days between two credit rating announcements (DISTANCE) is 60 days (= 
exp(4.0874) and 99 days (= exp(4.5951)). 10.84% of rating affirmations follow prior rating down-
grades (PRIOR_DNG), while 7.07% follow prior rating upgrades (PRIOR_UPG). About 2.80% of 
credit rating affirmations are accompanied with negative credit watch (WATCH_NEG), while 0.84% 
of credit rating affirmations are accompanied with positive credit watch (WATCH_POS). That is, 
only 3.64% of credit rating affirmations are announced with credit watch information in their re-
ports. The mean (median) absolute value of cumulative market-adjusted returns over the window 
from one day after prior credit rating announcement date before a rating affirmation to one day 
before the rating affirmation (ABS_PRE_CAR) is 0.1597 (0.0796). 
Panel B compares various firm characteristics between affirmations with prior investment 
grade (DMM1, DMM2, and DMM3) ratings with those with prior non-investment grade (DMM4) 
ratings. Relative to investment grade affirmations, the magnitude of stock market reaction around 
non-investment grade affirmation (CAR (-1,1)) is much higher (0.04% vs. 0.46%), suggesting that 
non-investment grade affirmation announcements are more favorably viewed by equity market 
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investors.7 Consistent with our prediction, both change in earnings forecast dispersion (Chg_Dis-
persion) and change in return volatility (Chg_RetVol) are more negative in the non-investment 
grade sample, suggesting that credit rating affirmations reduce information uncertainty to a larger 
extent for firms with non-investment grade ratings. We also find that firms with investment grade 
affirmations tend to be larger, growing, and covered by more stock analysts and have less debt. 
The proportion of affirmations following prior rating downgrades (PRIOR_DNG) and prior rating 
upgrades (PRIOR_UPG) are significantly larger in non-investment grade affirmations compared 
to investment grade affirmations. In addition, the percentage of affirmations with credit rating 
watch (WATCH_NEG and WATCH_POS) is larger for non-investment grade than investment 
grade.  
Table 2 Panel C provides the distribution of rating affirmations by credit rating agency. 
Since the sample size is smaller for the dispersion sample, we report the distribution for both dis-
persion and return volatility sub-samples. We find that in both samples, Fitch Service provides the 
most credit rating affirmations. More than 70% of affirmations are provided by Fitch Service in 
both the dispersion and return volatility samples.  
Table 3 reports correlation results among variables of our interest. We first find that CAR 
(-1,1) is negatively correlated with both Chg_Dispersion and Chg_RetVol although its correlation 
with Chg_Dispersion is not significant, suggesting that when affirmations increase (decrease) in-
formation uncertainty, the stock market reaction to affirmation announcements decreases (in-
creases). We also find that Chg_Dispersion is significantly positively correlated with Chg_RetVol 
(p-value <0.01), suggesting that our two proxies for information uncertainty—change in analysts’ 
                                                 
7 The untabulated t-statistics for difference test between investment grade and non-investment grade is 3.69, which 
indicates 1 percent significance level. 
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forecast dispersion and change in stock return volatility—capture a similar construct. However, its 
correlation coefficient (0.08) indicates that these two measures capture distinct aspects of infor-
mation uncertainty. We also find that the correlation between Chg_Dispersion and DMM4 is only 
significant and negative, preliminarily suggesting that analyst forecast dispersion is significantly 
reduced for firms with non-investment grade credit ratings after affirmation announcements. There 
is no such significant and negative correlation for all other groups - DMM1, DMM2, and DMM3. 
We also find a similar pattern for change in stock return volatility. Only the correlation between 
Chg_RetVol and DMM4 is significant and negative. Consistent with these results, CAR (-1,1) is 
significantly positive only for DMM4, suggesting that stock market reaction to affirmation an-
nouncements is significantly positive only for non-investment grade.  
Chg_Dispersion is significantly positively (negatively) associated with MTB and 
ANA_COV (LEV, BIG, PRIOR_DNG, and ABS_PRE_CAR), suggesting that a decrease in earnings 
forecast dispersion is smaller for firms with greater investment opportunities and greater analyst 
coverage while it is larger for firms with higher leverage, affirmations by S&P or Moody’s (BIG), 
affirmations after prior downgrades (PRIOR_DNG), and firms with more news between the affir-
mation and previous rating announcement (ABS_PRE_CAR). The correlation results based on 
Chg_RetVol are generally similar to those based on Chg_Dispersion. 
4.2. The effect of affirmations on change in information uncertainty 
Table 4 shows the mean and median changes for information uncertainty around credit 
rating affirmations. Panel A presents the results based on the change in analysts’ earnings forecast 
dispersion after affirmations. The change in earnings forecast dispersion around affirmations is 
significantly negative, with the mean (median) of -0.050 (-0.015), consistent with the first hypoth-
esis that credit rating affirmations reduce information uncertainty of equity market participants. 
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Further analysis shows that the mean change in earnings forecast dispersion around rating affir-
mation is significantly negative in DMM2, DMM3 and DMM4 while the mean change in forecast 
dispersion is not significant in DMM1. The median change in forecast dispersion around rating 
affirmation is significantly negative in all categories. Both mean and median changes in earnings 
forecast dispersion are monotonically more negative as prior credit ratings are worse. For example, 
the median change in earnings forecast dispersion is -0.008, -0.011, -0.018, and -0.047 for DMM1, 
DMM2, DMM3 and DMM4, respectively. There are significant differences in mean and median 
values between DMM4 and all other three groups of prior credit ratings. These results support our 
second hypothesis that rating affirmations for firms with non-investment grades reduce infor-
mation uncertainty to a larger extent compared to firms with investment grades.  
Panel B shows the results when the change in stock return volatility is used as a proxy for 
information uncertainty. Consistent with the result using earnings forecast dispersion, a change in 
return volatility around rating affirmation is significantly negative, with the mean (median) value 
of -0.056 (-0.039), implying that affirmations significantly reduce information uncertainty. Further 
analysis shows that the mean change in return volatility around affirmation announcements is sig-
nificantly negative for DMM3 and DMM4. The median change in return volatility around affirma-
tion announcements is also significantly negative for DMM3 and DMM4. There are significant 
differences in the mean and median values between DMM4 and the other three categories of prior 
credit ratings. These results are similar to those based on the change in earnings forecast dispersion, 
supporting our second hypothesis that credit rating affirmations reduce information uncertainty to 
a larger extent for firms with worse credit ratings.   
4.3. Multi-variate tests for the effect of affirmations on change in information uncertainty 
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We further test whether the extent of information uncertainty is reduced more significantly 
for non-investment grades after rating affirmations based on multivariate tests. Specifically, we 
estimate the following regression models: 
Δ Information Uncertainty = 0 + 1DMM2 + 2DMM3 + 3DMM4 + 4SIZEit + 5MTBit                 
                                                + 6LEVit + 7ANA_COVit + 8DISTANCEit + 9BIGit  
                                                + 10PRIOR_DNGit + 11PRIOR_UPGit  
                                                + 12WATCGH_NEGit + 13WATCH_POSit  
                                                +14ABS_PRE_CARit + Industry Fixed Effect + Year Fixed Effect                                
                                                + εit                                                                                            (1) 
 
Δ Information Uncertainty = 0 + 1DMM4 + 2SIZEit + 3MTBit + 4LEVit  
                                                + 5ANA_COVit + 6DISTANCEit + 7BIGit +8PRIOR_DNGit  
                                                + 9PRIOR_UPGit + 10WATCGH_NEGit + 11WATCH_POSit  
            + 12ABS_PRE_CARit + Industry Fixed Effect  
            + Year Fixed Effect + εit                                                        (2) 
 
For firm i and year t, change in information uncertainty (Δ Information Uncertainty) is 
either a change in earnings forecast dispersion (Chg_Dispersion) or a change in return volatility 
(Chg_RetVol). We decile-rank Chg_Dispersion and Chg_RetVol to mitigate the effect of outliers 
on our results and to readily assess the economic significance of our results.8  
We include control variables that are known to affect a firm’s information uncertainty. We 
include firm size (SIZE), since prior literature documents that large firms tend to have better infor-
mation environment. Leverage (LEV) and market-to-book ratio (MTB) are controlled for since 
firms’ information environment is affected by their debt level and growth potential. Analyst cov-
erage (ANA_COV) is included to control for the extent of a firm’s information environment af-
fected by equity analysts’ activities. We expect that the effect of a rating affirmation on a change 
in information uncertainty is weaker for firms followed by more equity analysts since firms with 
                                                 
8 We have qualitatively similar results when using continuous variables without decile-ranking. 
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greater analyst coverage tend to have better information environment. We also include a control 
for distance in days between two adjacent rating announcements (DISTANCE). To control for the 
effect of the size and reputation of credit rating agencies in our regression model, we include a 
variable, BIG since equity market participants may be more responsive to rating announcements 
by big credit rating agencies such as S&P and Moody’s. Both PRIOR_UPG and PRIOR_DNG are 
added to our regression models. PRIOR_UPG (PRIOR_DNG) equals one if the prior credit rating 
announcement to rating affirmation is an upgrade (downgrade), and zero otherwise. We expect 
rating affirmations to more reduce information uncertainty when prior credit ratings are either 
upgrades or downgrades, particularly downgrades, compared to when prior credit ratings are af-
firmations. We also take into account whether a credit rating affirmation is accompanied with 
negative or positive credit watch since these credit watches may provide additional information 
content to rating affirmations themselves. We next add a variable, ABS_PRE_CAR to control for 
the extent of new event-based information between affirmation announcement and previous rating 
announcement. It is measured as the absolute value of cumulative market-adjusted stock returns 
over the window from a day after the last rating announcement date prior to a rating affirmation to 
one day before the rating affirmation.  
Finally, we include industry fixed effects (based on Fama-French 48 industry classifica-
tions) to control for unobserved time-invariant cross-sectional variations in the information uncer-
tainty proxies across industries, and year fixed effects to control for systematic period effects such 
as differences in macroeconomic conditions that may affect all sample firms' information environ-
ment. Since observations are aggregated at the firm level, we examine the statistical significance 
of coefficients using standard errors adjusted for heteroskedasticity and within-firm clustering, 
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which takes into account serial correlation of observations within a firm (Petersen, 2009). All con-
tinuous variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% level to mitigate the effect of outliers on our 
results. 
Panel A of Table 5 presents the results of estimating equations (1) and (2) when information 
uncertainty is measured by the change in analysts’ earnings forecast dispersion. In the first column, 
we only include three indicator variables of prior credit ratings to rating affirmations (i.e., DMM2, 
DMM3, and DMM4). We find that only DMM4 is significantly negatively associated with the 
change in analyst forecast dispersion (p-value = 0.01). Our results are also economically signifi-
cant. The coefficient on DMM4 is -0.7773, indicating that rating affirmation reduces earnings fore-
cast dispersion of speculative graded firms by 77.73%. In the second set of the results with control 
variables, DMM4 is still significantly negatively related to the change in analyst forecast dispersion. 
The magnitude of the coefficient on DMM4 (= -0.6642) is still economically meaningful. 
In columns 3 and 4, we estimate the equation (2) which includes only DMM4 instead of 
three dummy variables used in the equation (1) to examine whether and how the effect of affirma-
tion reports for non-investment grade bonds are different from those of affirmation reports for 
investment grade bonds. Thus, the coefficient on DMM4 indicates the change in earnings forecast 
dispersion of non-investment grade, relative to that of investment grade. Results in column 3 are 
based on the equation (2) without control variables. We find that the coefficient on DMM4 is sig-
nificantly negative, suggesting that the reduction in earnings forecast dispersion after rating affir-
mations is greater for firms with non-investment grade credit ratings. The results of estimating the 
equation (2) with control variables are reported in the column (4) and qualitatively similar to those 
reported in the column (3). Panel B contains the results based on the change in return volatility 
after affirmations as a dependent variable instead of change in earnings forecast dispersion. We 
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find that these results are qualitatively similar to those based on the change in earnings forecast 
dispersion in Panel A. 
4.4. Stock market reaction to rating affirmation announcements 
In this section, we investigate the stock market reaction around credit rating affirmations 
for each prior rating category from DMM1 through DMM4. Since information uncertainty is more 
significantly reduced for non-investment grades, we predict that stock market reaction to rating 
affirmations is more significantly positive for non-investment grades. First, Panel A of Table 6 
shows stock market reaction to rating affirmations for DMM1 through DMM4 separately. The 
stock market reacts insignificantly to rating affirmations in DMM1, DMM2, and DMM3, while the 
mean stock market reaction to rating affirmations in DMM4 is significantly positive (CAR = 
0.46%). The results also show that the mean stock market reaction between DMM4 and other three 
prior rating categories are significantly different from each other. Inferences based on the median 
values are similar to those based on the mean values.  
Table 6 Panel B reports the results on the effect of credit rating affirmations on 3-day stock 
market reaction around affirmation announcements in a regression framework. Specifically, we 
estimate the following regressions: 
CAR (-1,1) = 0 + 1DMM2 + 2DMM3 + 3DMM4 + 4SIZEit + 5MTBit + 6LEVit  
                       + 7ANA_COVit + 8DISTANCEit + 9BIGit + 10PRIOR_DNGit  
                       + 11PRIOR_UPGit + 12WATCGH_NEGit + 13WATCH_POSit  
                       + 14ABS_PRE_CARit + Industry Fixed Effect + Year Fixed Effect + εit        (3) 
 
CAR (-1,1) = 0 + 1DMM4 + 2SIZEit + 3MTBit + 4LEVit + 5ANA_COVit  
                       + 6DISTANCEit + 7BIGit + 8PRIOR_DNGit + 9PRIOR_UPGit  
                       + 10WATCGH_NEGit + 11WATCH_POSit + 12ABS_PRE_CARit  
                       + Industry Fixed Effect + Year Fixed Effect + εit                                            (4) 
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We show the estimation results with or without control variables. The results in the column 
1 are based on the equation (3) without control variables. The coefficient on DMM4 is significantly 
positive. The column 2 reports the results of estimating the model (1) with control variables. We 
find that the coefficient on DMM4 is still significantly positive. Its magnitude of 0.0062 indicates 
that the stock market reaction to affirmations in DMM4 is greater by 0.62%, compared to affirma-
tions in DMM1. In columns 3 and 4, we estimate the equation (2) that replaces the three indicator 
variables (DMM2, DMM3 and DMM4) with DMM4 only (non-investment grade indicator). Simi-
lar to the results in columns 1 and 2, we find the coefficients on DMM4 are significantly positive, 
suggesting that the stock market reacts significantly and positively to affirmation announcements 
for firms with non-investment grade relative to those with investment grade. Turning to control 
variables, the coefficient on WATCH_NEG is significantly negative, implying that the stock mar-
ket reacts negatively to negative credit watch when it is added to the rating affirmation reports. 
Interestingly, the coefficient on WATCH_POS is not significant, suggesting that there is asym-
metry in the stock market reaction between negative and positive credit watch. 
4.5. Earnings forecast revision to rating affirmations 
For the completeness of our analysis, in this section, we further examine how affirmation 
announcements affect earnings forecast revision around credit rating affirmations. Since the pur-
pose of rating affirmations is to confirm prior credit ratings and thus affirmation announcements 
need not revise stock investors’ expectation on future cash flows, ex ante, we expect that earnings 
forecast revisions after rating affirmations is close to zero. Interestingly, the results in Panel A of 
Table 7 show that, inconsistent with our expectation, earnings forecast revision on average is sig-
nificantly negative for the entire sample. Specifically, the mean (median) earnings forecast revi-
sion is significantly negative at -0.231 (-0.031), implying that equity analysts tend to revise their 
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one year ahead earnings forecasts downward after affirmation announcements. Further analysis 
shows that the mean and median earnings forecast revisions are significantly negative to rating 
affirmations in all prior rating categories. One plausible explanation for this result is that since 
credit rating agencies are more conservative in terms of interpreting firm performance than equity 
analysts (Batta and Muslu, 2017), rating affirmations play some role in correcting equity analysts’ 
optimism underlying their earnings forecasts.  
We further examine the effect of rating affirmations on earnings forecast revisions in multi-
variate analyses. Specifically, we re-estimate equations (1) and (2) after replacing a dependent 
variable with earnings forecast revisions instead of the change in earnings forecast dispersion. 
Panel B shows that in column 2, the coefficient on DMM4 is significantly negative, suggesting 
that earnings forecast revisions after affirmations are significantly negative only for worse credit 
ratings. However, for all other columns, the coefficients on DMM4 are not significant, implying 
that there is no difference in earnings forecast revision between non-investment and investment 
grade. These results also suggest that our results on stronger stock market reaction to affirmations 
for non-investment grade are not related to the difference in earnings forecast revisions between 
investment and non-investment grade.   
 
5. Robustness Checks 
5.1. The relation between stock market reaction and change in information uncertainty 
In this section, we directly examine how change in earnings forecast dispersion as well as 
change in return volatility are associated with stock market reaction to credit rating affirmation 
announcements. Based on the standard dividend discount model, the literature generally suggests 
that stock market reaction to an economic event should be positively (negatively) related to an 
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increase in future cash flows (discount rate). For example, Clement et al. (2003) use earnings fore-
cast revisions and change in earnings forecast dispersion as proxies for the change in future cash 
flows (i.e., numerator effect) and the change in discount rate (i.e., denominator effect), respectively. 
They claim that positive stock market reaction to events should be associated with positive earn-
ings forecast revision and/or reduction in earnings forecast dispersion. Similar to Clement et al. 
(2003), we examine how stock market reaction to affirmation announcements is related to the 
reduction of dispersion in analysts’ earnings forecasts and/or the revision in analysts’ earnings 
forecast. To test this, we estimate the following regression models: 
CAR (-1,1) = 0 + 1Chg_Dispersion_Decileit + 2Revision_Decilesit + 3SIZEit + 4MTBit 
+ 5LEVit + 6ANA_COVit + 7DISTANCEit + 8BIGit + 9PRIOR_DNGit  
                        + 10PRIOR_UPGit + 11WATCGH_NEGit + 12WATCH_POSit  
                        + 13ABS_PRE_CARit + Industry Fixed Effect + Year Fixed Effect + εit          (5) 
 
CAR (-1,1) = 0 + 1Chg_RetVol_Decileit + 2Revision_Deciles + 3SIZEit + 4MTBit  
                       + 5LEVit + 6ANA_COVit + 7DISTANCEit + 8BIGit + 9PRIOR_DNGit  
                       + 10PRIOR_UPGit + 11WATCGH_NEGit + 12WATCH_POSit  
                       + 13ABS_PRE_CARit + Industry Fixed Effect + Year Fixed Effect + εit           (6) 
 
Variables are as defined above and in Appendix II. We decile-rank two main variables of 
stock market reaction – Chg_Dispersion (or Chg_RetVol) and Revision to better compare the mag-
nitudes of denominator and numerator effects on stock market reaction. It also helps to mitigate 
the effect of outliers on our results.  
The results of estimating the equation (5) are reported in Table 8. When earnings forecast 
dispersion is used as a proxy for information uncertainty, we find that the stock market reaction to 
affirmation announcements is significantly positively (negatively) related to Revision (Chg_Dis-
persion), implying that stock market reaction is more positive when earnings forecast revision is 
more positive or a change in earnings forecast dispersion is more negative. We find similar results 
when we use a change in stock return volatility as a proxy for information uncertainty. In sum, we 
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find that stock market reaction to affirmation announcements is directly related to a change in 
earnings forecast dispersion after controlling for earnings forecast revision. This result suggests 
that our finding on the positive stock market reaction to affirmation announcements is partly due 
to the reduction in information uncertainty of firms’ future payoff, particular with regard to dis-
count rate news.  
5.2. Results without observations with credit watch 
While we control for credit watch variables in our main tests, to further rule out a possibility 
that our results are driven by credit watch, we check to see whether our results are robust to the 
exclusion of observations with negative and positive credit watch (i.e., WATCH_NEG and 
WATCH_POS) bundled with affirmation announcements. In our sample, only about 3.64% of rat-
ing confirmations include negative or positive credit watch. The untabulated results show that our 
results are robust to the exclusion of such observations, ruling out the possibility that our results 
are affected by affirmations with credit watch.  
5.3. Results based on an alternative measure of information content 
Following the literature (e.g., Cready and Hurtt 2002), as an alternative measure of infor-
mation content, we also use the absolute value of CAR (-1, 1) as another dependent variable instead 
of changes in information uncertainty in the equations (1) and (2). In the first estimation, we only 
include indicator variables for categories of prior credit ratings. We find that DMM2, DMM3 and 
DMM4 are all positively related to the absolute value of CAR (-1, 1) and the coefficients show an 
increasing pattern from DMM2 to DMM4 (untabulated). When we include control variables in the 
equation (1), the results are qualitatively similar to those without control variables. We also use 
only an indicator variable of non-investment grade to replace our indicator variables of DMM2 to 
DMM4 and find that the coefficient on DMM4 is significantly positive, consistent with the results 
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based on the equation (1). In summary, these results corroborate our main findings that affirma-
tions have information that is useful to equity analysts and investors, in particular when affirmation 
announcements are for non-investment grade bonds. 
 
6. Conclusion 
We examine whether credit rating affirmations are informative to capital market partici-
pants, specifically sell-side equity analysts and stock investors. Prior studies mostly focus on credit 
rating downgrades and upgrades and thus our knowledge on the effect of rating affirmations on 
capital market participants’ decision is limited. We attempt to fill this void by examining how 
rating affirmations affect information uncertainty borne by equity analysts and stock investors.  
We document three important findings in this paper. We first document that on average 
the information uncertainty of equity analysts and stock investors is reduced after the announce-
ments of credit rating affirmation. We further find that the decline in the information uncertainty 
gets more pronounced if rating affirmations are made for non-investment grade bonds, implying 
that one of the unexplored informational roles of credit rating affirmations is related to the reduc-
tion in information uncertainty. Finally, we find that stock market reaction to affirmations becomes 
more positive if rating affirmations are made for non-investment grade credit ratings, consistent 
with our previous results that the reduction in information uncertainty is stronger for firms with 
non-investment grade credit ratings.  
We contribute to the literature in two ways. First, we fill a void in the literature on credit 
ratings by investigating the information role of credit rating affirmations in the capital market. 
While rating affirmations reiterate credit worthiness of a bond issued by a company from a credit 
rating agency, we show that equity analysts and stock investors view credit rating affirmations as 
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value-relevant information that decrease the information uncertainty of firms (particular those with 
non-investment grade bonds). Second, by focusing on credit rating affirmation announcements 
made by the third party, we expand the recent literature on the confirmation of prior information, 
for example, Clement et al. (2003) which examine the reiteration of prior information by managers.  
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Appendix I 
Classification by Credit ratings 
 
 Description 
Standard & 
Poor’s 
Moody’s Fitch 
Duff & 
Phelps 
Cardinal 
Scale 
Investment Grade 
Highest grade (DMM1) AAA Aaa AAA 1 
High grade (DMM1) AA (+, none, -) Aa (1,2,3) AA (+, none, -) 2,3,4 
Upper medium grade 
(DMM2) 
A (+, none, -) A (1,2,3) A (+, none, -) 5,6,7 
Medium grade (DMM3) BBB (+, none, -) 
Baa 
(1,2,3) 
BBB (+, none, -) 8,9,10 
Non-investment Grade 
Lower medium grade 
(DMM4) 
BB (+, none, -) Ba (1,2,3) BB (+, none, -) 11,12,13 
Speculative (DMM4) B (+, none, -) B (1,2,3) B (+, none, -) 14,15,16 
Poor standing (DMM4) CCC (+, none, -) 
Caa 
(1,2,3) 
CCC (+, none, 
-) 
CCC 17,18,19 
Highly speculative (DMM4) CC (+, none, -) Ca CC  20 
Lower quality, no interest 
(DMM4) 
C C C  21 
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Appendix II 
Variable Definitions 
 
Variable Definition 
Chg_Dispersion = The change in standard deviation of  equity analysts’ individual forecasts of 
year t+1 earnings before and after the credit rating affirmations scaled by 
the stock price. In calculating the forecast dispersion, we use forecasts is-
sued within 90-day window prior to credit rating affirmations and revised 
within 30-day window following the rating affirmations 
Revision = The change in analyst forecast consensus 90 days before and 30 days after 
the rating affirmations scaled by the stock price 
Chg_RetVol = The change in standard deviation of daily stock return over 30 days before 
and after the rating affirmations  
CAR (-1,1) = Cumulative abnormal returns over the event window from 1 day before to 
1 day after the credit rating affirmations 
DMM1 = 1 if the credit rating is AAA and AA (+, none, -) from S&P, Aaa and Aa 
(1,2,3) from Moody’s, AAA and AA  (+, none, -) from Fitch or Duff and 
Phelps, and 0 otherwise 
DMM2 = 1 if the credit rating is A (+, none, -) from Standard & Poor’s, A (1,2,3) 
from Moody’s Service, A (+, none, -) from Fitch Service or Duff & Phelps, 
and  0 otherwise 
DMM3 = 1 if the credit rating is BBB (+, none, -) from Standard & Poor’s, Baa (1,2,3) 
from Moody’s Service, BBB (+, none, -) from Fitch Service or Duff & 
Phelps, and 0 otherwise 
DMM4 = 1 if the credit rating is below BBB (+, none, -) from Standard & Poor’s, 
below Baa (1,2,3) from Moody’s Service, below BBB (+, none, -) from 
Fitch Service or Duff & Phelps, and 0 otherwise 
SIZE = Log of total assets at the beginning of the year 
MTB = The ratio of market value to book value of equity at the beginning of the 
year 
LEV = The sum of long term debt and debt in current liabilities scaled by the total 
assets 
ANA_COV = The number of  equity analysts following a firm 
DISTANCE = Logarithm of distance in days between a current rating affirmation an-
nouncement and prior rating announcement 
BIG = 1 if the credit rating is announced by S&P and Moody’s, and 0 otherwise 
PRIOR_UPG = 1 if the prior rating to a rating affirmation is an upgrade, and 0 otherwise 
PRIOR_DNG = 1 if the prior rating to a rating affirmation is a downgrade, and 0 otherwise 
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WATCH_NEG = 1 if the credit rating is accompanied with negative credit watch, and 0 oth-
erwise 
WATCH_POS = 1 if the credit rating is accompanied with positive credit watch, and 0 oth-
erwise 
ABS_PRE_CAR = The absolute value of cumulative market-adjusted returns over the window 
from a day after the last rating announcement date before a rating affirma-
tion to a day before the rating affirmation 
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Table 1  
Sample Selection Procedure 
 
Selection Criteria 
The Number of Rating 
Announcements 
Bond rating announcements between 1995 and June 2018 from 
FISD 
996,189 
Exclude Yankee bonds; issues which are denominated in a foreign 
currency; bonds issued through private placement; issues which can 
be converted to common stock 
897,627 
Exclude subsidiary and subordinated debt 710,424 
Exclude multiple rating announcements made on the identical date 67,555 
Exclude upgrades and downgrades 41,758 
Merge with COMPUSTAT, CRSP, and IBES 9,429 
Exclude observations that are not able to estimate following varia-
bles: SIZE, MTB, ANA_COV, DISTANCE, BIG, PRIOR_UPG, 
PRIOR_DNG, WATCH_NEG, WATCH_POS, FD, ABS_PRE_CAR, 
CAR, and Chg_RetVol 
8,694 
Exclude affirmations announced on the date of earnings announce-
ments and management earnings forecasts 
8,443 
Exclude observations that are not able to estimate change in analyst 
forecast dispersion 
3,404 
 
   
33 
 
Table 2 
Descriptive Statistics 
 
Panel A: Summary statistics          
Variables N Mean STD Median 25th 75th 
CAR (-1,1) 8443 0.0012 0.0358 -0.0000 -0.0141 0.0154 
Chg_Dispersion 3404 -0.0005 0.0046 -0.0002 -0.0009 0.0003 
Chg_RetVol 8443 -0.0006 0.0088 -0.0004 -0.0044 0.0033 
Revision 3404 -0.0023 0.0102 -0.0003 -0.0025 0.0009 
DMM1 8443 0.0707 0.2564 0 0 0 
DMM2 8443 0.3338 0.4716 0 0 1 
DMM3 8443 0.4121 0.4922 0 0 1 
DMM4 8443 0.1835 0.3871 0 0 0 
SIZE 8443 10.1054 1.8519 9.7962 8.8183 10.9850 
MTB 8443 2.7112 3.8683 1.8891 1.1655 3.2590 
LEV 8443 0.3115 0.1849 0.2812 0.1734 0.4314 
ANA_COV 8443 21.9508 10.6067 22 14 29 
DISTANCE 8443 4.0874 1.8783 4.5951 2.9444 5.5835 
BIG 8443 0.2795 0.4488 0 0 1 
PRIOR_DNG 8443 0.1084 0.3109 0 0 0 
PRIOR_UPG 8443 0.0707 0.2564 0 0 0 
WATCH_NEG 8443 0.0280 0.1648 0 0 0 
WATCH_POS 8443 0.0084 0.0913 0 0 0 
ABS_PRE_CAR 8443 0.1597 0.2156 0.0796 0.0226 0.2055 
 
Panel B: Comparison between Investment Grade and Non-investment Grade 
Variables 
Investment Grade  
(DMM1, DMM2, and DMM3) 
Non-Investment Grade  
(DMM4) 
Difference Test 
Mean Median N Mean Median N Mean Median 
CAR (-1,1) 0.0004 -0.0003 6894 0.0046 0.0023 1549 3.25 *** 2.65 *** 
Chg_Dispersion -0.0003 -0.0001 2904 -0.0014 -0.0005 500 2.93 *** 4.33 *** 
Chg_RetVol -0.0003 -0.0003 6894 -0.0017 -0.0011 1549 4.80 *** 4.85 *** 
Revision -0.0019 -0.0003 2904 -0.0047 0.0000 500 3.32 *** 1.40 
SIZE 10.3870 10.0506 6894 8.8524 8.8937 1549 42.58 *** 30.67 *** 
MTB 2.8155 1.9733 6894 2.2468 1.5201 1549 4.62 *** 11.70 *** 
LEV 0.2760 0.2560 6894 0.4697 0.4674 1549 36.01 *** 34.04 *** 
ANA_COV 22.7682 23.0000 6894 18.3131 17.0000 1549 15.72 *** 15.21 *** 
DISTANCE 4.0787 4.5951 6894 4.1261 4.5951 1549 0.93 0.17 
BIG 0.2409 0.0000 6894 0.4513 0.0000 1549 15.40 *** 16.67 *** 
PRIOR_DNG 0.0837 0.0000 6894 0.2182 0.0000 1549 12.21 *** 15.39 *** 
PRIOR_UPG 0.0595 0.0000 6894 0.1207 0.0000 1549 6.99 *** 8.50 *** 
WATCH_NEG 0.0258 0.0000 6894 0.0374 0.0000 1549 2.24 ** 2.51 ** 
WATCH_POS 0.0054 0.0000 6894 0.0219 0.0000 1549 4.33 *** 6.46 *** 
ABS_PRE_CAR 0.1365 0.0713 6894 0.2628 0.1442 1549 15.64 *** 16.65 *** 
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Panel C: Distribution of rating affirmations by credit rating agency 
Credit rating agency 
Dispersion Sample Return Volatility Sample 
Number % Number % 
Standard & Poor’s 342 10.05% 1107 13.11% 
Moody’s Service 464 13.63% 1253 14.84% 
Fitch Service 2579 75.76% 6015 71.24% 
Duff & Phelps 19 0.56% 68 0.81% 
TOTAL 3404 100% 8443 100% 
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Table 3 
Correlation Matrix 
 
  (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) 
CAR(-1,1) 
-0.02 -0.09 *** 0.09 *** -0.02 ** -0.01 -0.01 0.05 *** -0.03 *** 0.01 0.03 ** -0.02 ** -0.00 0.03 ** -0.01 0.03 *** -0.03 ** 0.00 0.02 * 
(1) 
Chg_Dispersion 
1 0.08 *** 0.08 *** 0.02 0.03 0.02 -0.08 *** 0.05 *** 0.06 *** -0.03 * 0.03 * -0.03 -0.06 *** -0.09 *** 0.01 -0.02 -0.01 -0.14 *** 
(2) 
Chg_RetVol 
  1 0.01 0.01 0.04 *** 0.01 -0.06 *** 0.04 *** -0.00 -0.03 *** 0.01 0.03 *** -0.07 *** -0.08 *** -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.07 *** 
(3) 
Revision 
    1 0.02 0.01 0.05 *** -0.10 *** -0.01 0.01 -0.07 *** 0.06 *** 0.03 ** -0.04 ** -0.04 ** -0.03  -0.02 0.01 -0.18 *** 
(4) 
DMM1 
      1 -0.20 *** -0.23 *** -0.13 *** 0.33 *** 0.06 *** -0.16 *** 0.07 *** -0.07 *** -0.00 -0.06 *** -0.05 *** 0.00 -0.02 * -0.08 *** 
(5) 
DMM2 
        1 -0.59 *** -0.34 *** 0.37 *** 0.05 *** -0.19 *** 0.30 *** -0.09 *** -0.09 *** -0.10 *** -0.06 *** 0.00 -0.04 *** -0.12 *** 
(6) 
DMM3 
          1 -0.40 *** -0.27 *** -0.04 *** -0.06 *** -0.19 *** 0.12 *** -0.04 *** -0.01 0.01 -0.03 ** -0.00 -0.02 
(7) 
DMM4 
            1 -0.32 *** -0.06 *** 0.41 *** -0.16 *** 0.01 0.18 *** 0.17 *** 0.09 *** 0.03 ** 0.07 *** 0.23 *** 
(8) 
SIZE 
              1 -0.10 *** -0.26 *** 0.47 *** -0.31 *** -0.29 *** -0.14 *** -0.12 *** -0.04 *** -0.04 *** -0.28 *** 
(9) 
MTB 
                1 0.02 ** 0.06 *** 0.02 0.05 *** -0.03 *** 0.01 -0.01 0.00 -0.03 ** 
(10) 
LEV 
                  1 -0.10 *** -0.03 *** 0.14 *** 0.09 *** 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.15 *** 
(11) 
ANA_COV 
                    1 -0.17 *** -0.11 *** -0.10 *** -0.03 *** -0.02 ** -0.04 ** -0.13 *** 
(12) 
DISTANCE 
                      1 0.08 *** 0.08 *** 0.07 *** 0.04 *** 0.01 0.28 *** 
(13) 
BIG 
                        1 0.23 *** 0.14 *** 0.11 *** 0.06 *** 0.31 *** 
(14) 
PRIOR_DNG 
                        
  
1 -0.10 *** 0.09 *** 0.03 *** 0.23 *** 
(15)   
PRIOR_UPG 
                        
    
1 0.01 0.03 *** 0.08 *** 
(16)     
WATCH_NEG 
                        
      
1 -0.02 0.06 *** 
(17)       
WATCH_POS 
                        
        
1 0.05 *** 
(18)         
ABS_PRE_CAR 
                        
          
1 
(19)           
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Table 4 
Univariate analysis on information uncertainty change around credit rating affirmations 
 
Panel A: Change in Forecast Dispersion 
  Full Sample 
  Mean  Median 
Change in forecast dispersions around rating affirmation -0.050 *** -0.015 *** 
      
Change in forecast dispersion around rating affirmation by prior credit ratings    
Change in forecast dispersion around rating affirmations in DMM1 -0.012 -0.008 ** 
Change in forecast dispersion around rating affirmations in DMM2 -0.035 *** -0.011 *** 
Change in forecast dispersion around rating affirmations in DMM3  -0.038 *** -0.018 *** 
Change in forecast dispersion around rating affirmations in DMM4 -0.145 *** -0.047 *** 
Difference test between DMM1 and DMM4 3.39 *** 3.59 *** 
Difference test between DMM2 and DMM4 2.87 *** 4.53 *** 
Difference test between DMM3 and DMM4 2.75 *** 3.16 *** 
 
Panel B: Change in Return Volatility 
  Full Sample 
  Mean  Median 
Change in return volatility around rating affirmation -0.056 *** -0.039 *** 
      
Change in return volatility around rating affirmation by prior credit ratings     
Change in return volatility around rating affirmations in DMM1  -0.016 -0.021 
Change in return volatility around rating affirmations in DMM2  -0.011 -0.015 
Change in return volatility around rating affirmations in DMM3  -0.045 *** -0.042 *** 
Change in return volatility around rating affirmations in DMM4  -0.174 *** -0.113 *** 
Difference test between DMM1 and DMM4 4.06 *** 3.36 *** 
Difference test between DMM2 and DMM4 5.06 *** 5.01 *** 
Difference test between DMM3 and DMM4 4.00 *** 3.73 *** 
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Table 5 
The effect of credit rating affirmations on information uncertainty 
 
Panel A: Change in earnings forecast dispersion after affirmations 
Dependent Variables = 
Chg_Dispersion Deciles 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value 
Intercept 5.7804 0.00 5.6765 0.00 5.5391 0.00 5.3923 0.00 
DMM2 -0.1823 0.42 -0.1252 0.59         
DMM3 -0.2725 0.26 -0.1841 0.49         
DMM4 (=Non-investment grade) -0.7773 0.01 -0.6642 0.05 -0.5481 0.00 -0.4872 0.02 
SIZE     -0.0049 0.93     0.0074 0.89 
MTB     0.0540 0.01     0.0566 0.01 
LEV     0.1429 0.74     0.1021 0.81 
ANA_COV     -0.0034 0.66     -0.0036 0.64 
DISTANCE     -0.0321 0.31     -0.0306 0.34 
BIG     0.1151 0.50     0.1136 0.51 
PRIOR_DNG     -0.4772 0.02     -0.4861 0.02 
PRIOR_UPG     0.1352 0.56     0.1318 0.57 
WATCH_NEG     0.1192 0.70     0.1233 0.69 
WATCH_POS     0.3020 0.64     0.2819 0.66 
ABS_PRE_CAR     -0.1253 0.72     -0.1273 0.71 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 3404 3404 3404 3404 
Adj. R2 3.84% 4.11% 3.85% 4.15% 
 
Panel B: Change in return volatility after affirmations 
Dependent Variable = 
Chg_RetVol Deciles 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value 
Intercept 5.0405 0.00 4.8467 0.00 4.9629 0.00 4.5824 0.00 
DMM2 -0.0029 0.98 0.0548 0.66         
DMM3 -0.1262 0.34 -0.1228 0.38         
DMM4 (=Non-investment grade) -0.3957 0.01 -0.3170 0.08 -0.3203 0.00 -0.2275 0.06 
SIZE     0.0007 0.98     0.0195 0.49 
MTB     -0.0122 0.19     -0.0108 0.24 
LEV     0.0009 1.00     -0.0402 0.88 
ANA_COV     -0.0076 0.08     -0.0066 0.11 
DISTANCE     0.0825 0.00     0.0828 0.00 
BIG     -0.1650 0.11     -0.1722 0.10 
PRIOR_DNG     -0.4679 0.00     -0.4771 0.00 
PRIOR_UPG     -0.0862 0.50     -0.0909 0.48 
WATCH_NEG     0.1566 0.46     0.1670 0.43 
WATCH_POS     -0.4042 0.27     -0.4182 0.25 
ABS_PRE_CAR     -0.0582 0.77     -0.0610 0.76 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 8443 8443 8443 8443 
Adj. R2 2.52% 2.99% 2.51% 2.97% 
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Table 6 
Stock market reaction around credit rating affirmations 
 
Panel A: Descriptive statistics 
  
Full Sample 
Mean  Median 
Stock market reaction to rating affirmation  0.12% *** -0.00% * 
      
Stock market reaction to rating affirmation by prior credit ratings     
Stock market reaction to rating affirmations in DMM1 -0.18% -0.15% 
Stock market reaction to rating affirmations in DMM2 0.04% -0.07% 
Stock market reaction to rating affirmations in DMM3 0.07% 0.04% 
Stock market reaction to rating affirmations in DMM4 0.46% *** 0.23% *** 
Difference test between DMM1 and DMM4 3.74 *** 2.50 ** 
Difference test between DMM2 and DMM4 3.06 *** 2.53 ** 
Difference test between DMM3 and DMM4 2.85 *** 2.04 ** 
 
Panel B: Regression results              
Dependent Variables =  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
CAR (-1,1) Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value 
Intercept -0.0040 0.39 -0.0023 0.73 -0.0014 0.75 0.0004 0.95 
DMM2 0.0025 0.07 0.0028 0.07         
DMM3 0.0029 0.08 0.0023 0.20         
DMM4 (=Non-investment grade) 0.0075 0.00 0.0062 0.01 0.0049 0.00 0.0038 0.02 
SIZE     -0.0001 0.79     -0.0002 0.67 
MTB     0.0000 0.70     0.0000 0.77 
LEV     0.0011 0.76     0.0013 0.71 
ANA_COV     -0.0001 0.14     -0.0001 0.22 
DISTANCE     -0.0001 0.70     -0.0001 0.66 
BIG     0.0018 0.23     0.0018 0.24 
PRIOR_DNG     -0.0016 0.37     -0.0015 0.38 
PRIOR_UPG     0.0029 0.14     0.0029 0.14 
WATCH_NEG     -0.0057 0.04     -0.0057 0.05 
WATCH_POS     -0.0017 0.71     -0.0016 0.72 
ABS_PRE_CAR     0.0016 0.58     0.0017 0.56 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 8443 8443 8443 8443 
Adj. R2 0.26% 0.35% 0.26% 0.34% 
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Table 7 
Earnings forecast revision around credit rating affirmations 
 
Panel A: Descriptive statistics 
  Full Sample 
  Mean  Median 
Earnings forecast revision around rating affirmation  -0.231 *** -0.031 *** 
      
Earnings forecast revision around rating affirmation by prior credit ratings     
Earnings forecast revision around rating affirmations in DMM1  -0.152 ***  -0.031 *** 
Earnings forecast revision around rating affirmations in DMM2 -0.216 ***  -0.039 *** 
Earnings forecast revision around rating affirmations in DMM3 -0.172 ***  -0.022 *** 
Earnings forecast revision around rating affirmations in DMM4 -0.466 ***  -0.004 *** 
Difference test between DMM1 and DMM4 3.35 *** 1.03 
Difference test between DMM2 and DMM4  2.98 ***  2.29 ** 
Difference test between DMM3 and DMM4  3.47 *** 0.18 
 
Panel B: Regression results  
Dependent Variables =  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Revision_Deciles Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value 
Intercept 6.6404 0.00 8.0837 0.00 6.3544 0.00 7.4365 0.00 
DMM2 -0.4067 0.13 -0.4265 0.10         
DMM3 -0.2662 0.32 -0.4696 0.10         
DMM4 (=Non-investment grade) -0.4945 0.12 -0.7651 0.04 -0.1894 0.41 -0.2931 0.26 
SIZE     -0.1757 0.01     -0.1531 0.02 
MTB     0.0025 0.91     0.0082 0.69 
LEV     -0.1514 0.78     -0.2409 0.65 
ANA_COV     0.0035 0.72     0.0020 0.84 
DISTANCE     0.1064 0.00     0.1104 0.00 
BIG     -0.2165 0.23     -0.2170 0.23 
PRIOR_DNG     -0.1445 0.50     -0.1608 0.45 
PRIOR_UPG     -0.2066 0.33     -0.2132 0.32 
WATCH_NEG     -0.0613 0.85     -0.0605 0.86 
WATCH_POS     0.2247 0.77     0.1781 0.81 
ABS_PRE_CAR     0.5884 0.10     0.5820 0.10 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 3404 3404 3404 3404 
Adj. R2 5.85% 6.71% 5.77% 6.63% 
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Table 8 
The relation between change in information uncertainty and stock market reaction around 
affirmation announcements 
 
Dependent Variables  
= CAR (-1,1) 
 
Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value 
Intercept 0.0007 0.95 0.0023 0.82 
Chg_Dispersion_Deciles -0.0006 0.03     
Chg_RetVol_Deciles     -0.0009 0.00 
Revision_Deciles 0.0015 0.00 0.0014 0.00 
SIZE 0.0003 0.71 0.0001 0.83 
MTB 0.0001 0.80 0.0000 0.85 
LEV 0.0001 0.99 0.0011 0.85 
ANA_COV 0.0000 0.84 0.0000 0.87 
DISTANCE -0.0004 0.34 -0.0003 0.39 
BIG 0.0029 0.24 0.0029 0.23 
PRIOR_DNG -0.0075 0.01 -0.0071 0.01 
PRIOR_UPG 0.0037 0.26 0.0034 0.31 
WATCH_NEG -0.0055 0.25 -0.0062 0.19 
WATCH_POS -0.0051 0.44 -0.0060 0.36 
ABS_PRE_CAR 0.0069 0.28 0.0098 0.07 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
N 3404 3404 
Adj. R2 2.14% 2.58% 
 
 
